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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Melvin Perkins appeals following the district court's denial of his request for
appointment of counsel and summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for
appointment of counsel because, at a minimum, his petition raised the possibility of two
valid claims.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Perkins filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, timely from the entry
of the judgment of conviction, in which he raised a number of claims, including two
claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to
ensure that the State complied with its obligations under the terms of a plea
agreement, 1 and failed to file a notice of appeal. (R., pp.1-6.) Along with his petition,
Mr. Perkins filed a motion requesting appointment of counsel.

(R., pp.16-18.)

The

State filed a boilerplate answer. (R., pp.31-35.) The district court then issued a Notice
of Intent to Dismiss in which it also denied Mr. Perkins' request for appointment of
counsel, concluding that all of his claims were "frivolous." (R., pp.37-57.)
After receiving Mr. Perkins' response to the district court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss (R., pp.58-92), the district court issued an order summarily dismissing his

1

The plea agreement required Mr. Perkins to plead guilty to one count of felony injury to
a child, in exchange for which the State promised to recommend probation and a
withheld judgment. (R., p.6.)

1

petition.

(R., pp.93-102.)

Mr. Perkins filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the order

summarily dismissing his petition. (R., p.103.)

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Perkins' motion for appointment of postconviction counsel?
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ARGUMEI\IT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perkins' Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel Because His Petition Raised, At A Minimum, The Possibility Of Two Valid
Claims

A.

Introduction
Mr. Perkins asserts that the district court's refusal to appoint counsel to assist

him in the prosecution of his verified petition for post-conviction relief (hereinafter,
Petition) was in error.

For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Perkins satisfied the

standard for appointment of counsel under Idaho Code § 19-4904 because his Petition
raised, at a minimum, the possibility of two valid claims, thereby requiring the district
court to appoint him counsel.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards

1.

Appointment Of Counsel

"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is
governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the
UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act]. a court-appointed attorney 'may be
made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. The
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion
of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004).
In Charboneau, the Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the postconviction proceeding is frivolous."

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown v.

State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 )).

It further held that the proceeding is not frivolous
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and, thus, counsel must be appointed, if the petitioner "alleges facts to raise the
possibility of a valid claim .... " Id. at 793 (emphasis added).

More recently, in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), the Supreme Court
affirmed the Charboneau standard:
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the
record for possible nonfrivolous claims/ Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,
679, 23 P.3d 138,141 (2001), the court should appoint counsel if the facts
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. The Swader Court also clarified that this standard is much

lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction relief on their merits
because, as was recognized in Charboneau, pro se petitioners generally cannot
investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of whether those claims will
ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 654-55.

2.

Standard Of Review

As noted above, in Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[t]he
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion
of the district court." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. Indeed, since Charboneau was
decided in 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to describe the standard for
appointment of counsel in discretionary terms. See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 738
(201 O); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529 (2007). From this language one would
think that a district court's denial of a motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel
would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal.

However, Mr. Perkins

contends that, the language of Charboneau, Workman, and Eby notwithstanding, the
5

Idaho Supreme Court no longer treats the evaluation of a motion for appointment of
post-conviction counsel as a discretionary decision and, therefore, the abuse of
discretion standard cannot apply on appeal.
The "possibility of a valid claim" standard that was adopted in Charboneau, and
affirmed in Swader, is a strictly legal standard that leaves no room for the district court
to exercise any discretion. Under that standard, if there is the possibility of a valid claim
(which is a purely legal question) the petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel,
while if there is no possibility of a valid claim (which is, again, a purely legal question)
the petitioner is not entitled to the appointment of counsel.

This was made clear in

Swader and Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339 (2009).
Swader was the first Idaho Supreme Court case to interpret and apply
Charboneau's "possibility of a valid claim" standard. In Swader, the district court had

applied the wrong legal standard in denying the petitioner's motion for appointment of
counsel but, instead of remanding the case for the district court to exercise its discretion
in light of the correct standard, the Supreme Court applied the correct standard itself,
determined that the petitioner-appellant had raised the possibility of a valid claim,
reversed the district court's order denying counsel, and then remanded the case to the
district court. Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55.
In Melton, although the result was different, the analysis was the same. In that
case, although the Supreme Court held that the district court had erred in failing to
consider the petitioner's motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel prior to
summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief, it declined the
petitioner's request to remand the case to the district court for an exercise of the district

6

judge's discretion and, instead, held that the error in failing to rule on the motion was
essentially harmless because the petitioner's "successive petition for post-conviction
relief did not raise the possibility of a valid claim." Melton, 148 Idaho at 342.
In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Swader and Melton, Mr. Perkins
contends that the decision to appoint counsel in a post-conviction case is discretionary
in name only, 2 and is really a strict question of law. As such, he contends that any
decision by a district court to deny a post-conviction petitioner counsel must be
reviewed de nova on appeal.

See Castorena v. General Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 713

(2010) ("This Court exercises free review over questions of law.").

2

In at least one other context the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that its "abuse
of discretion" standard of review was somewhat of a misnomer:
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for
reversible error.
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the
question must be whether the event which precipitated the
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for
mistrial has been denled in a criminal case, the "abuse of
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident,
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
When there has been a contemporaneous objection we determine
factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, then we determine
whether the error was harmless.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007) (citations omitted).
7

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perkins' Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel Because His Petition Raised, At A Minimum, The Possibility Of Two
Valid Claims
Mr. Perkins' Petition contained sufficient allegations that, at a minimum, raised

the possibility of two valid claims.

Those two claims are that Mr. Perkins received

ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) counsel failed to object to the State's breach
of the plea agreement, and (2) counsel failed to file a Notice of Appeal. 3 (R., pp.1-6.) A
discussion of both claims, including the district court's reasoning in disposing of the
claims, follows.

1.

Plea Bargain Claim

In his Petition, Mr. Perkins claimed that his attorney was ineffective for "fail[ing] to
hold the prosecutor's office accountable for a written plea agreement" that required the
State to request a withheld judgment and probation.

(R., pp.1-6.)

In support of that

claim, Mr. Perkins provided information in his verified Petition, as well as an attached
affidavit in which he asserted,
I spoke with [defense counsel] on several occasions, during one of the
visits with me [defense counsel] he informed me that the State was going
to offer me a plea agreement if I plead [sic] guilty. I asked about the
conditions of the plea bargain and he stated if [I] plead guilty to injury to a
child the State would offer me a withheld judgement [sic] and probation.
The only [r]eason [I] plead [sic] guilty to these charges [sic] that [l']m in
prison for [is] that my attorney advised me too [sic] because I was
suppose[d] to get probation only and not a day served in jail, other then
[sic] that [I] would have went [sic] to trial on all charges.

3

Because Mr. Perkins was not provided with counsel who could have assisted him in
developing the record and legal arguments as to his claims, he will not address the
merits of these claims except as necessary to establish that, through his petition and
supporting documentation, he raised the possibility of a valid claim as to each, requiring
the appointment of counsel.
8

(R., p.6.) In his verified Petition, Mr. Perkins noted that the district court had imposed a
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, following the entry of a judgment of
conviction in the underlying case, and that he was serving his sentence in the custody
of the Idaho Correctional Center.

(R., p.1.)

He also noted that "[t]he State failed to

keep its committment [sic] concerning my plea agreement." (R., p.2.)
The undisputed facts set forth in suppori of his Petition, and all reasonable
inferences flowing from those facts, establish the following: (1) Mr. Perkins had a plea
agreement, under the terms of which, the State agreed to recommend no more than a
withheld judgment and probation; (2) the State failed to honor that agreement by failing
to make such a recommendation; (3) Mr. Perkins' attorney failed to ensure that the
State abided by the terms of the plea agreement; (4) Mr. Perkins did not receive a
withheld judgment and probation; and (5) had he known that the plea agreement would
have been breached by the State, he would have gone to trial, rather than pleading
guilty. (R., pp.1-6.)
In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which include9 its order denying Mr. Perkins'
request for appointment of counsel, the district court did not address his claim that his
attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the State's breach of the plea agreement.
(R., pp.37-57.) The district court did address a claim that it perceived had been made

by Mr. Perkins, namely that his plea was involuntary because the State breached the
plea agreement

In addressing and rejecting that perceived claim, the district court

quoted from the portions of the Petition and affidavit that referred to his attorney's failure
to object to the State's breach of the plea agreement, but never analyzed the claim that
his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the breach.

9

(R., pp.50-53.)

Regardless, for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Perkins will proceed on the assumption that
the district court implicitly rejected this claim.
Failing to object to the State's breach of a plea agreement with respect to a
promise to make a sentencing recommendation constitutes deficient performance. In
State v. Gonzalez-Faguaga, 662 N.W.2d 581 (Neb. 2003), the Nebraska Supreme

Court considered whether a post-conviction claim that an attorney's failure to object to
the State's breach of a plea agreement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for
which an evidentiary hearing should have been held. The facts provided in support of
the petition were that the petitioner had pied no contest to a charge of first degree
assault, in exchange for the State promised to recommend that he receive a sentence
no greater than credit for time served if, at the time of sentencing, the petitioner was
subject to an immigration hold, and to stand silent as to the sentence if there was no
such hold. At the time of sentencing, the petitioner was subject to an immigration hold,
and, contrary to the plea agreement, the State stood silent as to the sentence, failing to
recommend that the petitioner receive a sentence of no more than credit for time
served. Ultimately, the court sentenced the petitioner to serve ten to fifteen years in
prison. Id. at 586-87.
In concluding that the petitioner had provided facts sufficient to warrant an
evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel, the Nebraska Supreme Court
considered his claim under both prongs of the test announced in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring that, in order to be entitled to relief as to a

post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must establish
that his attorney provided deficient performance and that the petitioner was prejudiced
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by that deficient performance). With respect to the deficient performance prong, the
Court explained,
If the State commits a material breach of a negotiated plea agreement, it
would be a rare circumstance when a lawyer with ordinary training and
skill in the area of criminal law would not inform the court of the breach.
While we afford counsel due deference to formulate trial strategy and
tactics, it is difficult to imagine what possible advantage a defendant could
gain by his or her counsel's remaining silent in such a situation. Only by
pointing out the breach can counsel protect the benefits the defendant
bargained to receive in exchange for his or her plea.

Id. at 588-89 (internal citations omitted).
Addressing the prejudice prong, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the trial
court's reasoning that the petitioner was not prejudiced because, even if the State had
complied with the plea agreement, it would not have changed the court's sentencing
decision. In rejecting the trial court's reasoning, the Court noted,
It is true that a judge is not bound to give a defendant the sentence
recommended by a prosecutor under a plea agreement That does not
mean, however, that to show prejudice, (the petitioner] had to allege that
but for his counsel's failure to object, the judge would have imposed a
different sentence. Instead the focus is on whether counsel's deficient
performance sacrificed [the petitioner's] ability to protect the bargain he
had struck with the State, thereby rendering the result of the proceedings
"fundamentally unfair."

Id. at 589 (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to cite to Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to either
specific performance or withdrawal of his or her guilty plea when the State breaches a
plea agreement even when the sentencing courl has indicated that the State's

compliance with the agreement would not have changed the sentence imposed. Id. at
590 (citing Santobello).
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It is clear from the record that Mr. Perkins established, at the very least, the
possibility of a valid claim on the issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of
counsel when his attorney failed to object to the State's breach of the plea agreement.
As such, the district court erred when it denied his motion for appointment of counsel.

2.

Notice Of Appeal Claim

The second claim for which Mr. Perkins established the possibility of a valid claim
was that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a
Notice of Appeal following his conviction. The facts provided in support of this claim
were, admittedly, brief. Specifically, in response to the prompt, "state concisely and in
detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests," Mr. Perkins wrote, "[a]lso
my attorney failed to file ... my direct appeal." (R., p.3 (empl1asis in original).)
In explaining why it intended to dismiss this claim without an evidentiary hearing,
the district court noted,
[O]ther than this bare statement, Mr. Perkins does not offer any other
argument or statement in support. Mr. Perkins does not allege or present
evidence that he actually requested his attorney file an appeal or that his
attorney failed to comply with such [a] request ... as the Petitioner has
not presented any evidence, or even asserted, that he communicated his
desire to appeal to his counsel or that his counsel understood he had
made such a request, the Petitioner has not stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
(R., pp.54-55.)

The problem with the district court's analysis is that, while it may have been the
proper analysis when considering whether to summarily dismiss the claim, it is not
appropriate under the lesser standard applied when deciding whether a petitioner has
raised the possibility of a valid claim such that he is entitled to appointed counsel to
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assist in crafting a legally-sufficient claim. Furthermore, it would be reasonable to infer
that the claim implies that he either instructed his attorney to file a Notice of Appeal or
that his attorney was ineffective in failing to consult with him regarding whether to file a
Notice of Appeal. 4 Either inference raises the possibility of a valid claim. Therefore,
Mr. Perkins was entitled to appointment of counsel to assist him in drafting a claim
sufficient to survive summary dismissal.

4

With respect to the latter possibility, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, in the
post-conviction context, that the American Bar Association "has provided guidelines
pertaining to a defense attorney's responsibilities to his client on appeal," including the
following:
After conviction, the lawyer should explain to the defendant the meaning
and consequences of the court's judgment and defendant's right to
appeal. The lawyer should give the defendant his or her professional
judgment as to whether there are meritorious grounds for appeal and as to
the probable results of an appeal. The lawyer should also explain to the
defendant the advantages and disadvantages or an appeal. The decision
whether to appeal must be the defendant's own choice.

Davis V. State, 116 Idaho 401, 411 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, Standards for Criminal Justice: The Defense Function, § 4-8.2 (1986
Supp.).)
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Perkins respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and the
district court's order denying his motion for appointment of counsel, and remand this
matter for the appointment of counsel, after which Mr. Perkins will have the opportunity,
with the assistance of counsel, to file an amended petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 20 th day of November, 2012.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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